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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
INTRODUCTION
Increased environmental regulation by governmental agencies has
greatly expanded litigation in the natural resources area, so this year's
land and natural resources survey includes environmental law cases.
The Tenth Circuit regularly defers to agency decisions in environmental
and natural resources cases' and this year's decisions are no exception.
In 1991, the court considered issues arising under a variety of statutes
including: (1) the Clean Water Act (CWA), 2 which establishes regula-
tory and enforcement programs for discharges into waters of the United
States; (2) the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA),3 or Superftind, which establishes financial
responsibility parameters for cleanup of hazardous waste sites and has
resulted in extensive litigation over cleanup costs; (3) the Federal Insec-
ticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),4 which governs the use
and registration of pesticides; and (4) the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), 5 which requires federal agencies to consider environmental
impacts from "major federal actions that have a significant effect on the
quality of the human environment."
This Article surveys select Tenth Circuit cases decided under envi-
ronmental and natural resource laws. Part One discusses certain envi-
ronmental law questions: Does FIFRA preempt local pesticide
ordinances? 6 Do present hazardous waste site owners have a right of
contribution from previous owners when cleanup is not consistent with
National Contingency Plan requirements? 7 Does the Clean Water Act
waive the federal government's sovereign immunity for civil penalty lia-
bility in a citizen suit action?8 What standard of review should the court
apply in determining the adequacy of an Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS)? 9 Part Two considers natural resource and public land ques-
tions: What constitutes final agency action such that a court may compel
by writ of mandamus the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to issue
an oil shale patent?' 0 Is a lease to use tribal land valid in the absence of
1. See, e.g., Quivira Mining Co. v. United States, 765 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1985); Na-
tional Cattlemen's Assoc'n v. United States, 774 F.2d 1008 (10th Cir. 1985); Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. United States, 612 F.2d 1232 (10th 1979).
2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(1988).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
4. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1988).
6. See COPARR, Ltd. v. City of Boulder, 942 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1991).
7. See County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1991).
8. See Sierra Club v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1991).
9. See Sierra Club v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 362 (10th Cir. 1991).
10. See Marathon Oil Co. v. Lujan, 937 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1991). Other Tenth Cir-
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compliance with NEPA?II May a private utility providing power to mu-
nicipalities receive a preference under the law of federal reclamation
and power?
12
PART ONE - ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
I. FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND RODENTICIDE ACT -
COPARR, LTD. V. CITY OF BOULDER
1 3
A. Facts
This case challenges two local ordinances that the City of Boulder,
Colorado (Boulder) enacted to regulate use of pesticides within city lim-
its. COPARR' 4 alleged that Boulder Ordinance Nos. 5083 and 5129,
enacted by Defendant-Appellee Boulder, violated the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution, arguing that FIFRA completely
preempts regulation of pesticides by local political subdivisions.
B. Background
1. FIFRA
Before 1947, states could exercise full regulatory authority over
pesticides. On June 25, 1947,15 Congress enacted FIFRA "to replace
and expand the protection" afforded by the Insecticide Act of 1910,
which was deemed inadequate due to growth in development of new
charcoal compounds and pesticide control products. 16 In 1972, Con-
gress passed sweeping amendments to FIFRA, 17 including "a number of
cuit mineral law cases not reviewed in this Article include Ash Creek Mining Co. v. Lujan,
934 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1991) (whether BLM withholding of lands from federal coal leas-
ing program is reviewable final agency action) and Trapper Mining, Inc. v. Lujan, 923 F.2d
774 (10th Cir. 1991) (whether government can reapportion coal leases based on new
laws), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 81 (1991).
11. See Sangre de Cristo Dev. Co. v. United States, 932 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1991).
Another Tenth Circuit Native American case not reviewed in this Article involves a patent
border dispute and the scope of the Secretary of the Interior's authority to correct land
patents. Foust v. Lujan, 942 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, case no. 91-1286 (U.S.
April 27, 1992).
12. See Salt Lake City v. Western Area Power Admin., 926 F.2d 974 (10th Cir. 1991).
The Tenth Circuit also revisited the Dillon Reservoir dispute, involving over forty years of
litigation regarding Denver's water rights. See City and County of Denver Bd. of Water
Comm'rs v. United States, 935 F.2d 1143 (10th Cir. 1991) (regarding the scope of Denver
water rights to fill and use Green Mountain Reservoir).
13. 942 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1991).
14. Plaintiff-appellants in this case are COPARR, Ltd. (Colorado Pesticide Applicators
for Responsible Regulation) and Victor A. Carand. COPARR is a Colorado nonprofit
corporation comprised of trade associations, individuals and companies who are engaged
in the business of commercial pesticide application in the City of Boulder and are subject
to certain provisions of the Boulder ordinances. Victor A. Caranci is an individual who
contracts for the commercial application of pesticides in the City of Boulder. Caranci and
Coparr members face injury in the form of compliance expenses or diminished business or
both, as a result of the enactment and enfdrcement of the Boulder ordinances.
15. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rbdenticide Act, Pub.L. No. 80-104, 61
Stat. 163 (1947).
16. See H.R. REP. No. 313,80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), repfintedin 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1200-01.
17. See Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86
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innovations to direct and strengthen federal control- over pesticides."' 18
FIFRA now confers upon EPA broad regulatory and supervisory author-
ity over pesticide and chemical substance application.' 9
EPA promulgated extensive regulations dealing specifically with
pesticide application. 20 EPA pesticide regulations address the follow-
ing: (1) evaluation of toxicological hazards to children and specific re-
lated warnings; 2 1 (2) requirements for pesticide storage and disposal;
2 2
(3) federal and state agency exemptions for emergency use;2 3 (4) pesti-
cide manufacturing registration; 24 and (5) standards for agricultural
worker protection.25 The Colorado statutory. scheme for pesticide regu-
lation parallels the federal statute: "A state may regulate the sale or use
of any federally registered pesticide or device in the state but on!y if and
to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use permitted by
this subchapter."
'26
2. The Boulder Ordinances and Preemption
Boulder Ordinance No. 5083, enacted to regulate certain pesticide
uses,2 7 gave the city manager power to enter upon all land within the
city boundary, whether public or private, to inspect and observe pesti-
cide use. In- 1988, Boulder, expanded its pesticide regulatory scheme by
enacting Ordinance No. 5129,28 which created additional controls over
pesticide use, such as pre-application public notice requirements.
2 9
C. The District Court Decision
COPARR argued that Congress possessed power under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution to preempt a local
ordinance in two ways.3 0 First, if Congress indicates "an intent to oc-
cupy a given field" and the local ordinance falls within that field, then it
is preempted.3 ' Second, if the ordinance "actually conflicts with a...
Stat. 973 (1972), designed to completely revive FIFRA. S. REP. No. 838, 92d Cong. 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993.
18. Organized Migrants and Community Action, Inc. v. Brennan, 520 F.2d 1161,
1165 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (FIFRA totally altered the preexisting regulatory structure).
19. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988).
20. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 152-172 (1988).
21. Id. § 155.
22. Id. § 165.10.
23. Id. § 166.
24. Id. § 167.
25. Id. § 170.
26. 7 U.S.C. § 136v (1988); see CoLo. REv. STAT. § 35-9-105 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
27. Ordinance No. 5083 was codified at BOULDER REv. CODE §§ 6-11-3 to 6-11-9
(Sterling Codifiers, Inc. 1989) (illegal to apply pesticides without a license as required by
the Applicators Act, to fail to maintain 'ecords, to fail to report to the City Manager spills
in violation of federal, state or city law, to fail to comply with various safety precautions, to
fail to notify tenants and employees of any indoor applications of pesticides or to violate
FIFRA, the Pesticide Act, the Pesticide Applicators Act, or any pesticide regulation).
28. Codified at BOULDER REV. CODE §§ 6-10-11, 6-11-12, and 6-10-14 (Sterling
Codifiers, Inc. 1989).
29. Id. §§ 6-11-2, 6-10-11.
30. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
31. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
1992] 999
DENVER UNIVERSITY L W REVIEW
federal statute,"'3 2 it is invalid. To determine whether Congress invoked
its preemptive power when statutory language is silent, courts often re-
view the statute's legislative history to establish congressional intent.
33
COPARR viewed the comprehensive nature of FIFRA to encompass the
entire field of pesticide regulation, including the pesticide use that Boul-
der sought to regulate. Boulder contended that the ordinance's public
notification requirement was beyond the scope of FIFRA.
There being no disputed questions of fact, COPARR and Boulder
presented the case via cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial
court 34 held that Ordinance No. 5083 was void because it provided for
local enforcement of FIFRA and the Colorado Pesticide Act.3 5 The
court upheld Ordinance No. 5129, ruling that it did not adopt or incor-
porate provisions of federal or state law and did not conflict with
FIFRA.3 6 The court ruled further that Boulder, as a homerule city
under Article X, Section 6 of the Colorado Constitution, had legislative
power to regulate use of pesticides.3 7 COPARR appealed the court's
declaration validating Boulder Ordinance No. 5129 in an attempt to es-
tablish that FIFRA preempts all regulation of pesticides by local govern-
mental entities.
D. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The issue on appeal was whether the court erred in holding that
FIFRA did not preempt local ordinance No. 5129. During the appeal,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Wisconsin Public
Intervenor v. Mortier3 8 to review a FIFRA preemption question. The
Tenth Circuit heard oral argument in COPARR, and then stayed its deci-
sion pending a ruling in Mortier. Following the Mortier decision, the
court requested supplemental briefing by the parties.
In Mortier, the petitioners asserted FIFRA does not occupy the en-
tire field of pesticide regulation because it expressly allows more strin-
gent state regulation. 3 9 Petitioners' emphasis on the need for
cooperative federalism in environmental protection apparently per-
suaded the Supreme Court.40 The Court held FIFRA provides no clear
congressional intent to preempt local authority over pesticide regula-
tion, despite the 1972 amendments establishing a comprehensive regu-
latory scheme.4 1 The majority stated:
The specific grant of authority in Section 136v(a) ... does not
serve to hand back to the State's powers that the statute had
32. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491 (1987) (quoting Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978)).
33. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U.S. 130, 140 (1986).
34. See 735 F. Supp. 363 (D. Colo. 1989).
35. Id. at 367.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 111 S.Ct. 2476 (1991).
39. 7 U.S.C. § 136v (1988).
40. 111 S.Ct. at 2485-87.
41. Id. at 2486.
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impliedly usurped. Rather, it acts to ensure that the States
could continue to regulate use and sales even where.., a nar-
row pre-emptive overlap might occur.
42
The Supreme Court held all local ordinances might not necessarily
be valid under FIFRA, but this particular regulation did not fall "within
any impliedly pre-empted field."' 43 Following the Mortier decision, the
Tenth Circuit held Boulder Ordinance No. 5129 conformed with both
Mortier and the recently amended Colorado Pesticide Act.44 Although
the Tenth Circuit found the Mortier decision conclusive on the issues
before it, the court noted conflicting state or local pesticide regulatory
schemes could, in fact, be preempted by FIFRA. 45
II. SUPERFUND - COUNTY LINE INV. Co. v. TINNEY
4 6
A. Facts
Tinney owned property in Wagner County, Oklahoma, leased to
Donald and Norma Tulk for use as a landfill from 1978 through Novem-
ber, 1983. The landfill allegedly received and disposed of hazardous
wastes. In 1982, County Line purchased the property from Tinney.
Shortly thereafter, the Oklahoma State Department of Health (OSDH)
forced the landfill to cease operations. In early 1984, the Tulks aban-
doned the landfill. In 1985, Tinney conveyed the property to Plaintiff-
Appellant Wagco, a subsidiary of County Line's parent company. In
early 1986, EPA gave notice to Wagco of the possibility that hazardous
substances deposited at the landfill were being released. Wagco sur-
veyed the site and located buried hazardous waste drums with high
metal concentrations. In late 1986, Wagco met with EPA and OSDH to
discuss the survey results and agreed formally to close the landfill pursu-
ant to OSDH regulations. OSDH approved Wagco's closure plan,
4 7
which was completed in June 1987 with costs in excess of $360,000.
During negotiations with the government, Tinney refused Wagco's re-
quest for financial participation in implementation of the closure plan.
B. The District Court Decision
Wagco brought a cost recovery action against Tinney for costs asso-
ciated with investigating and closing the landfill. Wagco based the ac-
tion on three separate theories: (1) Tinney, as former owner, was jointly
and severally liable under the private cost recovery provisions of CER-
CLA section 107;48 (2) Tinney was liable for contribution under CER-
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. COPARR, 942 F.2d at 727.
45. See Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158
(10th Cir. 1992) (FIFRA preempts state tort actions based on labeling and alleged failure
to warn).
46. 933 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1991).
47. Id. at 1510.
48. Id. (citing CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988)).
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CLA section 113(f) (3) (B);49 and (3) Tinney was unjustly enriched under
Oklahoma law.50 Tinney filed a motion for summary judgment as to
each claim in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma. Judge Ellison granted summary judgment in favor of Tin-
ney on June 30, 1989, and County Line appealed.
C. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the court's decision de novo, 5 1 particu-
larly, the issue of whether failure to comply with the National Contin-
gency Plan (NCP) barred private cost recovery or a contribution action
under CERCLA. On de novo review, the Tenth Circuit affirms summary
judgment only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
5 2
1. Cost Recovery Under CERCLA Section 107
The first issue reviewed by the Tenth Circuit was whether failure to
comply with the NCP barred a private cost recovery or a contribution
action under CERCLA. Section 107 of CERCLA provides that persons
responsible for disposal of hazardous materials are liable for all costs
incurred consistent with the National Contingency Plan ("NCP"). 5 s The
NCP establishes procedures and standards "for responding to releases
of hazardous substances," 54 and requires public comment whenever re-
medial action is taken. 55 Although the landfill owners viewed closure of
the landfill as a remedial action under the plan,5 6 the district court
found the remedial action improper in four respects: (1) site investiga-
tion; (2) remedy selection; (3) cost effectiveness; and (4) public partici-
pation standards and procedures.
5 7
The Tenth Circuit held that because section 107 allows individuals
to recover private party costs incurred "consistent with the National
49. Id. at 1510-11 (citing CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(3)(B) (1988)).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1511 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 52(c)); Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d
1228, 1230 (10th Cir. 1990)).
52. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). The statute states: "Any person who at the time of disposal
of any hazardous substances owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of ... shall be liable for ... any ... necessary cost of response
incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan."
54. Id. § 9605(a); 40 C.F.R. Part 300 (1988).
55. County Line, 933 F.2d at 1511.
56. A remedial action under CERCLA includes investigation and cleanup actions,
whereas removal action is generally considered for emergency response purposes. 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601(24) and (23). The NCP version in effect during closure of the Landfill
stated:
(a)(1) any person may undertake a response action to reduce or eliminate the
release or threat of release of hazardous substances, or pollutants or contami-
nated. Section 107 of CERCLA authorizes persons to recover certain response
costs consistent with this Plan from responsible parties.
(2) For purposes of cost recovery under § 107 ... a response action will be con-
sistent with the [National Contingency Plan] ....
See 1985 National Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 300.71 (1988).
57. County Line, 933 F.2d at 1512 (citing § 300.71(a)(2)(ii) of the 1985 NCP).
1002 [Vol. 69:4
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Contingency Plan,"5 8 proof of response costs is an element of a prima
fade private cost recovery action under CERCLA. 59 Therefore, CER-
CLA did not provide a remedy to Wagco because Wagco did not incur
costs consistent with the NCP. 60 The Tenth Circuit stated, however,
that some circumstances could permit CERCLA plaintiffs to recover
from a previous owner "even though the plaintiff has not yet established
that all of its claimed response costs were incurred consistent with the
NCP."'6 1 In Wagco's case, a fully developed record existed to make a
determination regarding whether Wagco incurred costs consistent with
the NCP6 2 and the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on this
issue.
2. Contribution Under CERCLA section 113(f)
Wagco next contended that it did not need to incur costs consistent
with the NCP to receive contribution under section 1 13(f)(3)(b) because
the law creates "an independent, substantive right to contribution."1
63
The Tenth Circuit viewed the provisions in section 113 "as part of the
larger statutory scheme of CERCLA," 64 rather than as an isolated, in-
dependent remedy. The court noted section 113 claims for contribution
could be inconsistent with the NCP Only if another basis for liability ex-
ists. Section 113 must follow the mandate of section 107, because sec-
tion 107 creates the sole basis for liability in this case, which requires
consistency with the NCP.
6 5
3. Unjust Enrichment
Wagco also attempted to recover under a state law theory of unjust
enrichment. The Tenth Circuit upheld dismissal of this claim, holding
that Tinney was not enriched by the cleanup because Wagco introduced
no evidence to show either that it had incurred costs or damages that
were potentially recoverable from Tinney ufider CERCLA or that
OSDH or EPA were contemplating a response action against Tinney.
Therefore, the benefit conferred on Tinney was "speculative at best."
'6 6
Although the result of this case is harsh, it might have limited prece-
dential value. The 1990 revisions to the NCP require "substantial"
rather than "strict" compliance with its provisions, making it less diffi-
cult for a party that engages in a cleanup action to show liability under
58. Id.
59. Id (citations omitted).
60. This case was reviewed pursuait to the 1985 NCP, which required "strict" compli-
ance. In 1990, the NCP was revised to require "substantial" compliance. The court did
not reach the question of whether the 1985 or 1990 NCP should apply as the landfill
closure was deemed to be inadequate under both versions of the NCP. Id. at 1514-15.
61. Id. at 1513.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1516.
64. Id.
65. Id at 1516-18.
66. Id. at 1518.
10031992]
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section 107, thereby establishing a more readily attainable predicate for
a section 113 contribution claim.
III. CLEAN WATER ACT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY -
SIERRA CLUB v. LUJAN
6 7
A. Facts
The Department of the Interior (Interior), through the Bureau of
Reclamation (Reclamation), owns and operates the Leadville Mine
Drainage Tunnel in Lake County, Colorado. The tunnel possesses a
long and checkered history. In 1944, as part of the war effort, Congress
appropriated $1.4 million to the Bureau of Mines to construct, operate
and maintain a drainage tunnel to drain the Leadville Mining District, a
mountainous area of significant mineralization. However, the federal
government abandoned the incomplete project upon conclusion of the
war. With the onset of the Korean conflict, tunnel construction was
again commenced, but again with limited success. In late 1959, Recla-
mation purchased the tunnel from the Bureau of Mines in an attempt to
acquire the right to water drained from the tunnel for its Fryingpan-
Arkansas project. However, the Colorado courts had determined that
water from the tunnel could not inure to the benefit of Reclamation
merely by virtue of ownership of the tunnel.
68
In 1972, Congress enacted the CWA "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters."
'6 9
The Leadville Mine Drainage Tunnel discharged into waters of the
United States, which required a CWA National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit. Reclamation obtained a NPDES
permit in 1975, which EPA renewed on several occasions. The NPDES
permit required Reclamation to ensure that drainage from the tunnel
meets specific effluent limitations.
B. The District Court Decision
On January 13, 1989, the Sierra Club and the Colorado Environ-
mental Coalition filed a citizen suit in federal district court alleging that
Interior and Reclamation violated the CWA and the terms of the NPDES
permit. Plaintiffs asked the court to: 1) issue a mandatory injunction
enjoining further permit violations; 2) order the agencies to pay civil
penalties; and 3) declare the agencies in violation of the CWA. The par-
ties entered into a consent decree on the liability question. The federal
government then moved to dismiss the civil penalties claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the waiver of sovereign immu-
nity in the CWA is limited and does not authorize assessment of civil
penalties against the United States. Plaintiffs filed a motion for sum-
67. 931 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Lujan 1].
68. See Leadville Mine Development Co. v. Anderson, 17 P.2d 303 (Colo. 1932) (tun-
nel drainage subject to appropriation under Colorado Water Adjudication System).
69. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
1004 [Vol. 69:4
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mary judgment on this issue. Concluding that the CWA waiver of sover-
eign immunity authorizes civil penalties against the United States, the
district court denied the federal government's motion to dismiss and
granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. 70 The district
court granted defendants' request to file an interlocutory appeal prior to
determination of the civil penalty amount.
7 1
C. The Tenth Circuit Decision
Largely reciting from the district court opinion, the Tenth Circuit
first reviewed the applicable law.72 It is axiomatic that the United States
as sovereign receives immunity from suit in the absence of its consent,
and Congress must unequivocally express any waiver of sovereign im-
munity.73 Any ambiguity in a waiver of sovereign immunity is to be in-
terpreted in favor of the sovereign. Courts must strictly construe a
waiver in favor of the sovereign and may not extend it beyond the lan-
guage of the statute.74
Defendants conceded that section 313(a) of the CWA waives sover-
eign immunity regarding the "requirements, administrative authority,
and process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of
water pollution." 75 However, the government contended that this
waiver did not authorize civil penalties against the United States because
the Act did not contemplate such penalties.
The federal government argued the phrase "process and sanctions"
of Section 313(a) must be read together to include only those monetary
sanctions necessary to ensure compliance with judicial process. Citing
McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger7 6 for support, the gov-
ernment asserted that the CWA evidences a waiver of sovereign immu-
nity only for traditional sanctions imposed to enforce judicial process
and injunctive relief. The McClellan court held that Congress did not
clearly and unambiguously waive civil penalties against federal facilities
in sections 313(a) and 505(a) of the CWA, 77 stating that section 313(a)
"is a compilation of ambiguity." 78 Other courts considering the waiver
of sovereign immunity under the CWA have disagreed with McClellan,
79
70. Sierra Club v. Lujan, 728 F. Supp. 1513, 1518 (D. Colo. 1990).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988).
72. Lujan 1, 931 F.2d at 1423 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478
U.S. 310, 315 (1986)).
73. Id. at 1423 (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting
United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969) and referencing Mitzelfelt v. Department of Air
Force, 903 F.2d 1293, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 1990)).
74. Id. (citing Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 686 (1983)).
75. Il at 1425; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988).
76. 655 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Cal. 1986).
77. Id. at 605.
78. Id. at 604.
79. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990), rev'd,
503 U.S. - (1992); California v. Dep't of Navy, 631 F.Supp. 585 (N.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd,
845 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988); Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. of Greater Chicago v. Navy, 722
F. Supp. 1565 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
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holding that the term "sanctions" encompasses civil penalties.8 0 This is
the talismanic issue examined by the Tenth Circuit.
The court first looked to Black's Law Dictionary, which defines
sanction as "that part of a law which is designed to secure enforcement
by imposing a penalty for its violation."8 1 It also looked to the Supreme
Court's Gwaltney8 2 decision that held civil penalties authorized by the
CWA may be interpreted as sanctions. The Circuit Court further noted
the same section of 313(a) that "discusses 'process and sanctions' also
states that the United States [is] liable for 'civil penalties.' "83 The court
concluded that "the sanctions authorized by [Section 313(a)] are also
penalties, particularly when the same statute also permits 'those civil
penalties arising under Federal Law.' ",84
Second, the court looked to section 505(a) of the CWA.8 5 Section
505 permits private citizens to file complaints against any person, in-
cluding the government, alleged to be in violation of an effluent stan-
dard or limitation of the CWA or an order issued by the Administrator
or a state with respect to such a standard or limitation. The statute also
states "the district courts shall have jurisdiction ... to enforce such an
effluent standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Admin-
istrator to perform such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any
appropriate civil penalties under Section 1319(d) .... 86
The CWA's penalty provision states that any person who violates
the enumerated provisions of the Act, or "any permit condition or limi-
tation implementing any of such sections in a permit issued under...
[the NPDES program] by the Administrator, or by a State ... shall be
subject to a civil penalty. .. ,'87 The government argued the genera-
lized definition of "person" contained in section 502 of the CWA, which
does not include the United States, should be used in interpreting the
citizen suit provision, again citing McClellan in support of its position.
The court adopted plaintiffs' interpretation, however, that the definition
of "person," modified to specifically include the United States in the
citizen suit provision, should be used in interpreting a citizen suit claim
for civil penalties.
The court held the language of sections 313(a) and 505(a) consti-
tutes an express waiver by the United States of its sovereign immunity
for civil penalties, eliminating any need to resort to the legislative his-
tory to justify its decision. Nonetheless, the court did examine the legis-
lative history, and found that it was not inconsistent with its conclusions
concerning the plain language of the statute.8 8
80. See Lujan 1, 931 F.2d at 1425.
81. Id at 1426 (citing BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1203 (5th Ed. 1979)).
82. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 53
(1987).
83. Lujan I, 931 F.2d at 1426.
84. Id.
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).
86. Id. § 1365(a).
87. Id. § 1319(d).
88. Lujan I, 931 F.2d at 1427.
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Recently in United States Department of Energy v. Ohio,8 9 the United
States Supreme Court effectively reversed the Tenth Circuit Lujan opin-
ion. In an action brought by the State of Ohio for civil penalties under
state CWA and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)90
programs, the Supreme Court held Congress did not waive federal sov-
ereign immunity from liability for civil penalties imposed by a state for
federal violations of the CWA or RCRA. The Court distinguished pen-
alty provisions that result in sanctions imposed through the judicial pro-
cess to achieve prospective compliance by federal agencies, which are
authorized under the Acts from punitive civil penalties imposed for fed-
eral violations against the federal government not authorized by the
Acts. The Court determined that Congress did not expressly waive fed-
eral sovereign immunity because the penalty provisions of the CWA and
RCRA are ambiguous.
IV. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AcT - SIERRA CLUB V. LUJAAN
9 1
A. Facts
The Burr Trail, a county road,9 2 serves as an important recreation
corridor connecting the Bullfrog Basin Marina at' Lake Powell with the
Town of Boulder, Utah. The Trail both crosses and borders on public
lands, including recreation and wilderness areas and state lands. Gar-
field County proposed to widen twenty-eight miles of the Trail to ac-
commodate expanding use and create safe travel conditions, for which
the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) prepared an "environmental
assessment" (EA) pursuant to NEPA.9 3 The Sierra Club brought suit
claiming that the proposed widening exceeded the scope of the R.S.
2477 right-of-way and that BLM violated NEPA.9 4 The district court in
that case held that widening was consistent with the scope of the right-
of-way under Utah state law and that the BLM satisfied NEPA's require-
ments.9 5 When Sierra Club appealed, the Tenth Circuit reversed on the
question of whether BLM had satisfied NEPA's procedural requirements
and remanded to BLM on narrowly-defined grounds with instructions
on NEPA compliance. On remand, BLM prepared a supplemental EA,
accompanied by a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI). Sierra
Club then challenged the FONSI, which eventually led to another Tenth
Circuit appeal.
89. See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. (1992).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 6901-92 (1988)
91. 949 F.2d 362 (10th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Lujan II].
92. R.S. 2477 right-of-way issues have given the Burr Trial a rich litigation history.
Garfield County holds an R.S. 2477 right-of-way for the Burr Trail. See 43 U.S.C. § 932
(repealed by FLMPA, 706(a) Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2793).
93. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1988).
94. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 675 F. Supp. 594 (D. Utah), rev'd in part, 848 F.2d 1068,
1083 (1988).
95. Hodel, 675 F.Supp. at 617-19.
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B. The District Court Opinion
The United States District Court for the District of Utah upheld the
BLM FONSI. The court applied an arbitrary and capricious standard of
review despite Tenth Circuit law holding that "reasonableness" is the
standard to be applied in evaluating NEPA compliance. Accordingly,
the Sierra Club again appealed.
C. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The primary focus in this chapter of the Burr Trail litigation is the
scope of review used by courts to evaluate NEPA compliance and deter-
mine whether an agency must prepare an EIS. Prior Tenth Circuit cases
apply a "reasonableness" standard of review to an agency's threshold
NEPA determination. 9 6 The Tenth Circuit was faced with the task of
rectifying this standard under the Supreme Court decision in Marsh v.
Oregon Natural Resources Council.97 In Marsh,98 the Supreme Court re-
jected the "reasonableness" standard of review of an agency decision
not to prepare a supplemental Environmental Impact Statement because
it "involves primarily issues of fact," to which the APA arbitrary and
capricious standard applies.99 In dicta, the Court noted that this stan-
dard is also used on review of the agency decision not to prepare an
EIS. 1 00
Circuit courts vary in their interpretation of Marsh. The Eleventh
Circuit altogether rejected the reasonableness test in its review of NEPA
compliance activities. 1i The Tenth Circuit adopted the Eighth Circuit
view, 10 2 applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to factual deter-
minations and maintaining the reasonableness standard for review of
legal questions. As such, the Tenth Circuit specifically reaffirmed its ap-
plication of the reasonableness standard in Park County Resource Council v.
United States Dep't of Agriculture,1 3 as consistent with Marsh. Under this
standard of review, the Tenth Circuit found the BLM FONSI sufficient
under NEPA and upheld it on appeal.
PART Two - NATURAL RESOURCES AND PUBLIC LANDS
I. OIL SHALE PATENTS - MARATHON OIL CO. v LUJAN
10 4
A. Facts
The Marathon decision belongs to a long line of oil shale cases in
96. Lujan II, 949 F.2d at 362.
97. 490 U.S. 360 (1990).
98. Id
99. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 377 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
100. Id.
101. North Buckhead Civic Ass'n v. Skinner, 903 F.2d 1533, 1538 (11th Cir. 1990).
102. Goos v. I.C.C., 911 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir. 1990).
103. 817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1987).
104. 937 F.2d 998 (10th Cir. 1991).
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Colorado. 10 5 Plaintiff Marathon Oil Company 10 6 owns six contiguous
association placer mining claims in Western Rio Blanco County, Colo-
rado. Marathon located the claims on April 5, 1918, and they comprise
some 983 acres. After locating its claims, Marathon performed the req-
uisite annual assessment work to maintain its unpatented claims.' 0 7
Marathon Oil began its effort to patent the claims under the Mining
Law of 1872108 in March of 1986. However, from March 1986 through
May 1987, Interior imposed an administrative moratorium on process-
ing oil shale patent applications while the agency developed new regula-
tions governing the definition of "valid discoveries." By December 9,
1987, plaintiffs filed all required proofs for a patent pursuant to 30
U.S.C. § 29. Interior reviewed the application, confirming that plaintiffs
had met all requirements of posting notice, publication, title, improve-
ments, survey, and other necessary final proofs as documented in its
draft final Mineral Report, made available in February, 1989, but took
no further action. Plaintiffs brought suit in late 1989 in the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado to compel final agency
action.
B. The District Court Decision
In its opinion, the district court first resolved whether full compli-
ance with the patent requirements had caused property rights to vest in
Marathon Oil's unpatented oil shale claims. Interior argued that the
patent interests had not vested, because it had not formally issued the
Final Mineral Report approving patenting of the claims. The court re-
lied on a long line of cases ruling that, upon compliance with the several
requirements of 30 U.S.C. § 29 for patenting claims, Marathon Oil's
property rights vest. 10 9 Interior did not appeal this ruling.
The lower court's second ruling was reversed on appeal. The dis-
trict court viewed Interior's duty to issue patents as ministerial in nature
and not discretionary because Marathon had fully complied with all re-
quirements and was merely awaiting signature of the Final Mineral Re-
port. The district court ruled that, although discretion exists in
determining whether a patent application satisfies the requirements of
30 U.S.C. § 29, once it is determined that the applicant satisfies those
requirements, the Secretary of Interior has a nondiscretionary duty to
issue the patent. This case presented novel and compelling facts con-
cerning the Secretary's nondiscretionary role because all parties agreed
105. Those cases are listed at Marathon Oil Co. v. Lujan, 751 F. Supp. 1455, 1457, n.3
(D. Colo. 1990).
106. Plaintiffs include Joan L. Savage, Barbara Cliff Toner, and Frank G. Cooley as
personal representative of the Estate of Cameron Cliff. Marathon Oil Company repre-
sented the interests of all plaintiffs.
107. The case contains an extensive and informative discussion of the history of mining
law.
108. 30 U.S.C. § 21-54 (1988).
109. These cases are listed in Marathon Oily. Lujan, 751 F. Supp. 1455, 1459 (D. Colo.
1990).
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that it was not the patent application itself, but the regulatory process
and moratorium that delayed patent issuance. The court ruled that Inte-
rior abused its discretion in failing to perform a nondiscretionary minis-
terial act, 110 and granted mandamus relief to compel Interior to
perform its duty." 1 The court ordered Interior to "expeditiously com-
plete administrative action" on plaintiffs' patent application and to issue
a patent within thirty days.1 12 The court further enjoined defendants
from failing to complete administrative action and ruled on summary
judgment. 1
13
C. The Tenth Circuit Decision
On the final day allowed by the district court to issue the patents,
Interior appealed. TheTenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined the
primary issues on appeal were: (1) whether the thirty day time limit
mandated by the trial court was too short a period for Interior to finalize
the oil shale patent application decisions, and (2) whether the district
court abused its discretion in reducing Interior's decision to a ministe-
rial act. The Tenth Circuit ruled only on the mandamus relief and not
the other remedies provided by the lower court.
1 14
The three-member panel included Judge Holloway, Judge Ebel,
who wrote the opinion, and Judge Aldisert, sitting by designation from
the Third Circuit. The court reviewed the long history of delay in issu-
ing Marathon's patent, and affirmed the trial court's conclusion that
thirty days is ample time to finalize the patent proceedings. Neverthe-
less, the Tenth Circuit determined that the remaining day left under the
District Court order was not sufficient to fulfill the government review
process, and provided fifteen additional days for completion of final
agency action. 115 The court's ruling on this issue intertwines both prac-
tical and legal considerations. The legal reasoning, embedded in foot-
note 7 of the opinion, 1 16 is that Interior's decisionmaking should not
halt during rulemaking proceedings, because Interior still maintains au-
thority to act under the statute. Therefore, a regulatory moratorium is
not sufficient justification for an agency to avoid timely performance of
its duties. Practically speaking, however, the court noted that even
under the new regulations, the oil shale claims remain patentable.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with Interior on the second issue and
held that the district court abused its discretion in compelling the Secre-
tary to issue the patents because "[t]he Department has not yet deter-
mined officially that all conditions to issuance of the patents have
110. Id. at 1460.
111. Id. at 1464.
112. Id. at 1473.
113. Id.
114. Marathon, 937 F.2d at 498 (other remedies merely duplicated the mandamus
relief).
115. Id. at 502.




occurred."' 1 7 The result is that until agency action is final, an agency
can exercise its discretion and thereby prevent its role from being re-
duced to a purely ministerial function. Thus, until an agency affixes its
signature to a document, it retains discretion to alter its position.
II. LAND USE ON RESERVATIONS - SANGRE DE CRISTO DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY V. UNITED STATES 
1 18
A. Facts
The Sangre de Cristo Development Company (Company), formed
by Sante Fe residents in 1968, negotiated with the Teseque Pueblo
(Pueblo) to build a golf course and residential area on Pueblo land. 19
The Company entered into an agreement leasing 5,000 acres for devel-
opment, which lease was approved by the Department of Interior in
1970.120 When the Company began selling lots, several area landown-
ers and environmental groups claimed that Interior's lease approval was
invalid because it failed to satisfy the requirements of NEPA.12 1 The
groups filed suit to enjoin further development.' 2 2 The Tenth Circuit
held Interior's lease approval was a major federal action significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment, 12 3 triggering NEPA pro-
cedural requirements. 124 The court also granted injunctive relief.
12 5
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) then began preparing an Environ-
mental Impact Statement (EIS). During this period, the Pueblo leader-
ship changed and formally requested invalidation of the lease. Based on
environmental considerations and the Pueblo's opposition, Interior re-
scinded its approval of the lease. The Company then filed for
bankruptcy.
B. The District Court Decision
The Company brought suit against the United States in the District
Court for the District of New Mexico126 alleging: (1) just compensation
was due under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment because Inte-
rior's actions deprived it of vested property rights; (2) the United States
was liable under contract and trust theories; and (3) negligent lease ap-
proval prejudiced the Company's exercise of the lease. 12 7 Chief Judge
Juan Burciaga ruled in favor of the United States on all claims.'
28
117. Id. at 501 (Footnote 8 contains further discussion of the legal analysis).
118. 932 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied Case No. 91-1286 (U.S. April 27, 1992.
119. Id.
120. d at 893 (lease approval by Interior is required under 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) (1970)).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Ia (citing Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1972)).
124. Id. (citing NEPA § 4332(C) requirements of an environmental impact study).
125. Ia (citing Davis, 469 F.2d at 597).
126. Id. at 891.
127. Id. at 892-3.
128. Ia at 891.
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C. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The first claim on appeal was for just compensation from an alleged
governmental taking under the Fifth Amendment. 129 To receive "just
compensation," the Company was compelled to demonstrate it held a
vested interest and Interior's action amounted to a taking.'3 0 The Com-
pany argued that the Tenth Circuit's remand instruction in Davis v. Mor-
ton 13 1 evidenced the lease's validity because it ordered the trial court
simply to enjoin the project pending compliance with NEPA. i3 2 On re-
view, however, the Tenth Circuit clarified its earlier opinion, stating it
never reached the question of lease validity.13 3 Relying on its decision
in Gray v. Johnson,13 4 the Tenth Circuit held that a valid approval was
necessary to lease Reservation lands.' 35 To create a vested interest in
the lease, Interior's approval must be "within the bounds of their [sic]
authority" and in the best interests of the Tribe. i3 6 The court invali-
dated the lease because Interior was "without authority to grant the
lease since no environmental impact study was conducted prior to ap-
proval." The Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the takings claim be-
cause an invalid lease vests no property rights.'
3 7
The Company next alleged that the United States, "by virtue of its
pervasive involvement in the contract,"' 3 8 became a party to the
lease' 3 9 and breached the contract. The Tenth Circuit identified the re-
lationship between the parties, holding the Pueblo lessors, the Company
lessee, and the United States with "no property interest in [the] Pueblo's
land."' 40 The statutory section1 4 ' under which Interior approves leases
on Reservation lands did not implicate the United States as a party to
leases between Indian tribes and lessees. 14 2 The United States might
assume liability if it contracted on the Pueblo's behalf, but in this case, it
merely approved the lease.' 43 However, even if the United States
signed the lease as trustee, this alone would not create liability because
the United States is not liable to third parties when contracting on be-
129. Id. at 892.
130. Id. at 894 (citing In re Consol. United States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d
982, 988 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988)).
131. 469 F.2d at 598.
132. The Tenth Circuit instructed the court to issue a Writ of Mandamus and to enjoin
the United States from acting on the lease agreement "until the environmental impact of
the project had been studied and evaluated" according to the "mandate of NEPA." 932
F.2d at 894 (citing Davis, 469 F.2d at 595).
133. 932 F.2d at 894.
134. 395 F.2d 533, 537 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 906 (1968).
135. See 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) (1970) (Indian lands may be leased with the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior).
136. 932 F.2d at 894 (citing Gray, 395 F.2d at 537).
137. Id. at 895.
138. Id.
139. The Company tried, but failed, to strengthen this allegation by asserting the
United States acted as a trustee. Id.
140. Id.
141. 43 U.S.C. § 415 (1988).
142. 932 F.2d at 895.




half of Indian tribes. 144 As precedent, the court cited United States v.
Algoma Lumber Co., 14 5 in which Interior approved and entered into, on
behalf of the Klamath Indians, a logging contract with a timber com-
pany. 146 In Algoma, although timber payments were deposited into the
United States treasury and the United States signed the contract, Al-
goma could not recover overpayment from the United States. 14 7 Fi-
nally, even if the United States assumed liability under either contract
or trust theories, by invalidating Interior's lease approval in its Davis
opinion, the Tenth Circuit eliminated any potential liability of the
United States.
148
Reviewing the district court's factual findings under a clearly erro-
neous standard, 14 9 the Tenth Circuit addressed whether the United
States negligently prepared the EIS. The negligence allegedly delayed
finalizing the lease, which delay ultimately led to lease disapproval. The
Tenth Circuit summarily dismissed this claim, holding that the district
court's conclusions were amply supported by the record and were not
clearly erroneous. 150




Utah Power and Light (UP&L) applied for federal power on behalf
of more than 100 of its subscriber cities, towns and counties in Utah and
Wyoming. UP&L interpreted the Reclamation Project Act of 1939 to
authorize power allocations to municipalities as qualified preference en-
tities in the sale of federal hydropower.' 52 UP&L also applied for pref-
erential federal power allocation on its own behalf for resale at cost to its
municipal customers. Alternatively, UP&L contended it could bid for
federal power from the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). 1
53
WAPA concluded neither UP&L nor its subscribers qualified as "prefer-
ence entities" under reclamation law because the municipalities did not
operate the utility systems directly, and rejected the application on this
144. Id. (citing United States v. Algoma Lumber Co., 305 U.S. 415, 423 (1939)).
145. 305 U.S. 415 (1939).
146. Id.
147. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the validity of Algoma noting that a recent decision
finding the United States liable to an Indian Tribe under a limited trust relationship did
not overrule Algoma because the United States was liable to the Tribe, not to third parties.
Sangre de Cristo, 932 F.2d at 896. See also United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
148. Sangre de Cristo, 932 F.2d at 896.
149. Id- at 897.
150. Id. at 897-898.
151. 926 F.2d 974 (10th Cir. 1991).
152. 43 U.S.C. § 485(h) (1988).
153. WAPA markets power generated from western federal water and power projects,
including the Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP). The CRSP Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 620-
92(o)) governs power marketing in the area of UP&L's application, and it incorporates
federal reclamation law, including § 9(c) of the Reclamation Project Act (43 U.S.C.
§ 485(h)(c)). WAPA, 926 P.2d at 977.
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basis. WAPA further determined UP&L was not eligible to purchase its
power.
B. The District Court Decision
UP&L challenged WAPA's refusal to allocate power in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah. UP&L also challenged cer-
tain WAPA practices, including WAPA's purchase of non-federal power
to meet its firm power obligations154 Judge Thomas Green held for
WAPA, finding WAPA reasonably interpreted federal law governing
preference in the sale of federal hydroelectric power and its decision to
purchase non-federal power to maximize sales of federal power was not
ultra vires.15 5 UP&L appealed the district court's grant of summary
judgment.
C. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The issues on appeal ,ere: (1) whether WAPA reasonably inter-
preted federal preference law in determining that a preference not be
granted to UP&L as agent for the municipalities; (2) whether the Colo-
rado River Storage Project (CRSP) Act prohibited WAPA from purchas-
ing non-federal power; (3) if not prohibited, whether WAPA's proposed
non-federal power purchases were arbitrary and capricious; and (4)
whether Congress authorized WAPA, as an agency in the Department of
Energy ("DOE"), to participate with private utilities in the construction
and financing of transmission lines.
1. Preference Entities under Section 9(c) of the Reclamation
Project Act of 1939
Section 9(c) of the Reclamation Project Act states "preference shall
be given to municipalities and other public corporations or agencies
.. " in the sale of federal hydroelectric power.' 55 WAPA, Reclamation
and DOE consistently interpreted section 9(c) as giving preference only
to municipalities actually operating utility systems, not to every city or
town satisfying the dictionary definition of a "municipality." UP&L ar-
gued that WAPA interpreted section 9(c) contrary to its plain language,
contending the statutory language clearly makes all municipalities pref-
erence entities, so the court should give no deference to WAPA's
interpretation. 1
5 7
The Tenth Circuit identified the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Chevron, USA v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel 158 as the prevail-
ing analysis regarding deference to agency decisions. Because Congress
154. Firm power is power that is guaranteed to be a available at all times. WAPA, 926
F.2d at 980 n.4.
155. The District Court certified, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) that its ruling on the
preference in ultra vires claims was final. Id. at 977 n.1.
156. 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c).
157. UP&L's argument was adopted by Judge Tacha in dissent.
158. 467 U.S. 837, 842-42 (1984).
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did not address this precise question in either the statute or its legisla-
tive history, the majority identified the appropriate Chevron test as:
when an administering agency's interpretation of a statute is
challenged, and traditional tools of statutory construction yield
no relevant congressional intent, the reviewing court must de-
termine if the agency's construction is a permissible one.1 5 9
The court then equated the permissible standard with reasonable-
ness. 160 To be reasonable, the agency's interpretation need not be the
only possible interpretation. 161 Finding no clear expression of congres-
sional intent, and concluding that the agencies' longstanding interpreta-
tion of section 9(c) is reasonable, the court upheld WAPA's construction
of the statute. 16 2 The Tenth Circuit noted as reasonable WAPA's con-
clusion that the benefits of preferential access to federal hydroelectrical
power should be enjoyed by the public, rather than the private sector.
2. WAPA's Purchase of Non-Federal Power
UP&L contended WAPA's practice of buying power produced at
non-federal power plants for resale was ultra vires. WAPA purchased
non-federal power to insure a dependable energy supply. UP&L argued
WAPA possessed no statutory authority to make these purchases. The
Tenth Circuit found the plain language of the statute did not prohibit
WAPA from purchasing non-federal power and the statute's legislative
history did not demonstrate congressional intent to prohibit non-federal
power purchases. 163 The Tenth Circuit also rejected UP&L's argument
that WAPA could not interact with non-federal entities absent specific
congressional approval because federal courts long recognized the in-
herent authority to purchase power on credit from other sources when
conditions prevent hydroelectric facilities from functioning at
capacity.'
64
Neither the statute nor the legislative history address how WAPA
may accomplish its required objective of maximizing the sale of federally
produced power at firm rates. In affirming summary judgment, the
court deferred to the administering agency's interpretation of the stat-
ute, and found WAPA authorized to perform those tasks reasonably nec-
essary maximize the sale of federal power at firm rates, which included
acquisition of non-federal power.'
65
UP&L also did not prevail in its claim that WAPA exceeded the
scope of its authority in the volume of its non-federal power purchases.
The Tenth Circuit agreed WAPA did not possess unlimited authority to
159. WAPA, 926 F.2d at 981.
160. Id.
161. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11.
162. WAPA, 926 F.2d at 978 (quoting United States v. Shimmer, 367 U.S. 374, 382
(1961)).
163. Id. at 980 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1087, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1956
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346, 2362).
164. Id. at 980-81 (citing United States v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 652 F.2d 1341,
1345 (9th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted)).
165. Id. at 980 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 620(o).
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purchase non-federal power. However, the Tenth Circuit noted, when
interpreting general reclamation statutes, federal courts allow power
marketing agencies to purchase non-federal power that is reasonably in-
cidental to the integration of federally-produced hydroelectric
power.1 66 In UP&L's case, Congress directed WAPA to maximize the
sale of federally-produced power and, therefore, authorized it to
purchase such power as necessary to meet its objectives.
16 7
3. Participation in Private Utility Transmission Line Projects
Finally, UP&L contended WAPA possessed no authority to partici-
pate with private utilities in constructing and financing the Craig-Bo-
nanza Transmission Line because this transmission line promoted
WAPA's "brokerage activities." 168 UP&L asserted section 1 of the Colo-
rado River Storage Project (CRSP) Act' 69 authorized only the construc-
tion of specified initial CRSP units. The Tenth Circuit held that CRSP
Act did not prohibit construction of future transmission lines in connec-
tion with the project because Congress granted broad authority to oper-
ate, build and maintain transmission lines.
170
D. The Dissenting Opinion
Circuit Judge Tacha voiced concern as to whether the court must
defer to the agency decision based on the plain language of section 9(c)
of the Reclamation Project Act.' 7 1 Judge Tacha found clear congres-
sional intent regarding a preference for municipalities regardless of
whether they met the agency-imposed municipality operated utility re-
quirement. Judge Tacha referenced a series of cases following Chevron
in which the Supreme Court acknowledged that deferential review did
not replace a federal court's duty to interpret statutes using traditional
rules of statutory construction.1 7 2 The Judge stated:
I can see no difference between the power request of a single
municipality and the request of a group of municipalities repre-
sented by another entity that distributes power to them at cost.
In my view, the congressional intent expressed in the plain lan-
guage of section 9(c) is to provide preference to municipalities
simply based on their status as political subdivisions, not in
their capacity to distribute power.
173
In the dissent's view, WAPA's requirement of direct municipality utility
control to receive preference contradicted the clear congressional man-
166. Id. at 982 (citing Kansas City Power and Light, 115 F. Supp. at 417).
167. The Court applied the arbitrary and capricious standard of review to WAPA's non-
federal purchasing decisions and noted that the scope of review was a narrow one. WAPA,
926 F.2d at 982.
168. Id. at 982-893.
169. 43 U.S.C. § 620 (1988).
170. Id. at 983 (citing Department of Energy Organization Act § 302, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7152(a)(1)(E)).
171. WAPA, 926 F.2d at 983.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 985.
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date that municipalities receive federal power.1 74
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's Chevron 175 decision announced a rule of stat-
utory interpretation, which the Tenth Circuit has interpreted as requir-
ing deference to virtually any and all reasonable agency interpretations
of law. This judicial deference makes it difficult to challenge an agency
interpretation of law because the Tenth Circuit decisions tend to equate
standard of "reasonableness" with "not arbitrary." In the cases sur-
veyed in this Article, the Tenth Circuit found for the defendant, United
States, in four of five cases. 176 By accepting agency interpretations of
law without independent evaluation, the courts abdicate their primary
role to construe the law, especially where an agency interpretation ex-
pands the scope of its jurisdiction. Courts should determine indepen-
dently whether an agency's interpretation of the law is reasonable in
light of congressional intent. Courts should not allow the agency's in-
terpretation of that intent, which is often driven by non-congressional or





175. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
176. Ironically, the one case in which the Tenth Circuit did not rule for the govern-
ment, Sierra Club v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 1421, was effectively reversed by the Supreme Court
decision in United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. - (1992).
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